AIHRC investigation into the shooting of demonstrators in Sheberghan on 28 May 2007

 

1. Summary

On 28 May 2008, Afghan security forces killed 9 people and injured a further 42 when they opened fire directly on a group of unarmed protesters in Sheberghan, Jowzjan province.

The protestors had been throwing stones at the police forces present and were pushing towards the blocked off governors compound. But the response of the security forces was entirely out of proportion to any threat faced, happened without warning and continued to target the crowd even as it was fleeing. It therefore constitutes a serious violation of Afghan national law as well as international human rights standards. 

As this report shows, the available evidence puts much of the blame for what happened on the governor and deputy governor and their team of personal bodyguards. The Afghan government must ensure that those bearing responsibility for the shootings are held accountable and must take decisive steps to prevent any similar incidents from occurring in future.  

 

2. Recommendations 

To the Government of Afghanistan:

• Ensure that those responsible for the incident at the highest level are held fully accountable. Their team of bodyguards is by far the unit most seriously implicated in the shootings. As those ultimately responsible for the bodyguard team specifically and all security forces operating on 28 May generally, responsibility for the incident must fall on the governor of Jowzjan and his deputy. Though there exists substantial evidence warranting deeper suspicion, at the very least both are guilty of a disastrous failure of command and oversight that ultimately led to the shooting of 51 unarmed protestors.
   
• Further investigate the possibility that the shooting of the demonstrators was done under specific orders. If this is found to be the case ensure that those responsible are held fully accountable under Afghan law.
   
• Equip that the Afghan National Police with adequate supplies of non-lethal weapons for riot control and provide full training on how to utilize them effectively.
   
• Ensure that no personnel outside the standard chain of command of the Afghan National Police are allowed to wear ANP uniforms. Even officially registered personal bodyguards of public figures must wear a separate kind of uniform if they do not fall under direct and effective operational command of the ANP.
   
• Emphasize the essential nature of establishing a unified command structure in all security operations involving multiple security forces.
   
• Continue to push for the complete and effective disarmament of all private militias in the country.

 

3. Methodology

In its investigation the AIHRC team completed 66 interviews with the following list of persons. In addition the AIHRC also analyzed 4 different video recordings (one taken by ISAF PRT observers, one by Aina TV and two by local shopkeepers) as well as numerous photographs documenting the incident.

Victims:

• 15 injured victims in hospital
• 4 injured (treated and released)
• Families of 6 deceased victims

Neutral eyewitnesses:

• 5 local eyewitnesses
• 2 PRT eyewitnesses (Com. Johann & Com. Mikko)
• 4 US ETT eyewitnesses

Security forces present at the incident:

ANP

• Provincial chief of police
• 2 officers of police Criminal Investigations Division (CID)
• Police, head of provincial detention center
• Commander of police 07 Battalion
• 4 injured policemen

NSD

• Provincial head of NSD

 ANA

• Acting Commander, 5^th Kandak, 209 Corps
• Chief of Staff, 5^th Kandak, 209 Corps
• 1 soldier eyewitness

 Governors bodyguards

         Officially assigned security delegate

         De-facto commander of governors guards

Government and political:

• Governor
• Deputy governor
• Provincial Council
• Regional Chief of police
• Head of Junbish
• Spokesperson for Junbish
• Junbish womens council

 Health workers:

• Chief surgeon, Sheberghan hospital
• 1 nurse, Sheberghan hospital
• Acting provincial head of public health department

Other:

• Governmental investigative delegation
• Parliamentary investigative delegation
• UNAMA
   

4. The Events of 28 May

a. Prelude:

Following a period of regional political tension, a public demonstration against the provincial government authorities was scheduled to take place in Sheberghan, Jowzjan province, on 28 May 2007. Local elders formally announced the demonstration to the provincial police headquarters 24 hours in advance and undertook to ensure that it remained nonviolent. The demonstration was also endorsed by the Junbish political party.

On 27 May two emergency meetings involving all the provincial security actors were held in the governors office. The governor did not attend the first meeting but was present at the second one. Several measures were decided. These included the provision of an additional 220 Afghan National Army (ANA) troops from the 209 Corps as well as several Afghan National Police (ANP) officers, to be brought in from Mazar-i-Sharif. Also, Sheberghan hospital was put on standby and alerted to prepare for as many as 200 new patients.

At least 5 separate units of national security forces participated in the security operation launched in response to the demonstration. Besides the provincial ANP team, a command-technically independent reinforcement police team, the so-called Battalion 07, was involved in the police operation. In addition, the ANA supplied troops and the NSD acted in a monitoring function. Finally, a large team of partly officially registered and partly private, heavily armed bodyguards were tasked with protecting the governor and his deputy and staff. 

b. The demonstration: 

The demonstration commenced on 28 May at around 07.30am. Eventually, at around 08.30am, approximately 2000 protestors gathered outside the governors office and the provincial police headquarters building. Up to this point the demonstration was entirely peaceful and nonviolent.

Several lines of security forces protected the governors office and police HQ. Closest to the protestors was a line of ANP officers equipped only with riot shields and batons. Some meters behind them was a line of ANP officers with AK 47 automatic weapons, backed up, another few meters back, by a line of fully armed ANA troops. The governors premises were personal also protected by numerous armed men from his and the deputy governors bodyguard team. Finally, there were ANP officers as well as governors bodyguards stationed on the rooftop of both buildings, with at least one heavy PKK machinegun positioned on the governors roof. There were also Swedish and Finnish ISAF teams from the Jowzjan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) as well as an American ANA Embedded Training Team (ETT) present as observers at the site. 

The protestors were chanting slogans against the governor and the provincial authorities, holding up several pictures of General Dostum and a picture of General Dostum together with President Karzai. At one point General Dostum drove though the site of the protest with a large convoy composed of 10 vehicles and at least 40 heavily armed guards. He was greeted with loud cheers but did not stop or address the crowd. Throughout the demonstration no direct negotiations between the protestors and the governors office took place.

According to eyewitnesses and video evidence, initially there were a number of elders and women at the front of the crowd, attempting to restrain some of the more agitated protesters. As the crowd became progressively more unruly the women retreated though in the videos the elders along with some demonstrators can be seen to continue in determined attempts to control the crowd.

These attempts, however, were of limited effectiveness, as protesters repeatedly threw stones at the police forces and continued to push up against the security lines. The governor stated that flying stones injured a total of 17 policemen and bodyguards thought the ANP security chief suggested only 3 were hurt. The AIHRC investigative team was able to directly verify stone-throwing related injuries in 3 policemen and at least one ANA soldier. An American soldier who observed the whole incident reports that the situation was getting worse. The crowd was throwing rocks and batteries and coming towards the ANP protective line shoulder to shoulder. The observer emphasizes though that he saw no weapons in the crowd. This observation is confirmed by the video evidence and by almost all other eyewitnesses, including protesters, members of the Afghan security forces and the Swedish and Finnish ISAF teams present on site.

The governor insisted that the demonstration amounted to an armed rebellion and his office repeatedly claimed that it was accompanied by a militia buildup at important points around the city. Similarly, the deputy governor alleged that this was not a demonstration but a coup behind the scenes. As is shown above the actual demonstration, if not entirely peaceful, did most definitely not amount to an armed rebellion. And in its inquiries the AIHRC investigation could also not find any proof to support the claim of a coup behind the scenes, with many of those interviewed stating that they had seen no signs of an increased presence of armed elements in the area.

c. The shootings:

At around 09.30am the only baton and riot-shield equipped front line of ANP officers withdrew under continuing pressure from the protestors and the crowd rushed forward. Suddenly automatic fire opened up from several different locations. There are several credible reports that this initial shooting was preceded by a single shot fired from the roof of the governors house a few seconds beforehand. The acting ANA commander, for instance, states that the ANP retreated back and the ANA with them. Behind us [the ANA line in front of the governors house] one shot was fired from the rooftop. Then the shooting started. A local shopkeeper also claimed that a man standing on the roof of the governors office fired the initial shots. Immediately afterwards, heavy firing opened up from several locations. One of the injured, finally, reported that When the shooting started, I ran away. I was near Qurban [the deputy leader of the provinces Junbish youth; he was killed in the shooting by a direct shot to the head] and I saw one soldier shoot him. Then the other soldiers started to shoot at the crowd. I ran away and I left Qurban there.

According the two videos that show the first burst of automatic fire without cut (one taken by the ISAF troops, the other by Aina TV) it lasted for around 22 seconds. At least a substantial part of this firing was aimed directly at the crowd of people and continued even after they were fleeing away from the protective lines. This is corroborated by the video evidence; almost all witness statements including the PRT eyewitness reports that bullets fired from the governors compound were hitting an only around 1.5 meters high wall located on the other side of the protestors opposite the compound; and by the number and kind of injuries suffered by the victims, the large majority of whom was shot from behind or from the side.

Relatively soon after the first shooting a much smaller crowd of around 50 people regrouped. They removed President Karzais picture from the gate of the police headquarters replacing it with one of General Dostums and again moved towards the governors compound. Although witnesses consistently report that there were still no weapons in the crowd, security forces opened fire for the second time. The automatic fire lasted for around 10 seconds. Again, shooting was aimed directly against the protestors, though given the much smaller crowd it resulted in fewer injuries. After the second shooting the protestors dispersed completely.

In total, in the two incidents of shooting 9 people were killed and another 42 were injured. As of 2 June, 4 of the injured were still in critical condition, with another 17 injured seriously enough to remain hospitalized.

 5. Legal Analysis

a. Applicable international human rights standards:

International human rights law establishes, as per article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Afghanistan has ratified, that the right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. This right is subject to legal restrictions necessary in order to protect, amongst others, national security or public safety, public order  or the protection of the rights and freedom of others.

Imposing any restrictions deemed necessary and ensuring public order may well require police operations. This is especially the case if an assembly becomes less than clearly peaceful and the government acts on its right and duty to prevent the commission of any crimes. However, any such official actions must comply with the basic human rights standards governing the code of conduct for law enforcement officials and specifically the use of force in police operations.

The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials states in article 3 that law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty. Similarly, the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provide in principles 4 and 5 that law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall as far as possible apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force. ... Whenever the lawful use of force ... is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall ... exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offense. Any legitimate objective should be achieved with minimal damage and injury, and the universal right to life must be respected.

In other words, official security forces may only use force if this is strictly necessary. When the use of force really is necessary then the degree of force used must be directly proportional to what is required to achieve the legitimate aim of the operation and its use must respect and preserve human life to the maximum extent possible.
 

b. Applicable Afghan law: 

Like international human rights law, Afghan law recognizes the right to peaceful, unarmed assembly and protest (2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, article 36). 

In terms of regulating official response to any unlawful behavior, the Afghan Police Law of 2005 reflects the international principles of necessity and proportionality. It requires that first non-lethal weapons be used (article 20) and article 24 specifically states that the police may use firearms or explosives against a group of people only if they have resorted to offensive acts of disturbing the security by means of weapons and if the use of other means of force applied against them individually has proved ineffective. In this case, it is imperative to first announce the use of firearms or explosives by giving at least three verbal warnings followed by three gunshot warnings

c. The case of the Sheberghan demonstration:

It is clear that the shootings of 28 May in Sheberghan constitute a serious violation of both Afghan law and international human rights law standards.

Most importantly, the evidence shows that the crowd of demonstrators did not carry any weapons and that their offensive acts consisted only of the throwing of stones and unruly behavior. This probably goes beyond what can be considered a peaceful assembly and might have justified the governmental security forces in breaking up the demonstration. Under no circumstances, however, should such behavior necessitate the use of firearms against the demonstrators, leave alone the use of lethal force.

The violation is aggravated by the fact that there appears to have been no warning given to the protestors before opening sustained automatic fire directly on the crowd. The video evidence and witness statements show to no kind of concerted efforts were made to issue a warning of the impending use of lethal fire, leave alone that the three verbal warnings followed by three gunshot warnings required by Afghan law were given. Even those witnesses that suggest the first wave of shooting was preceded by a single shot, identify that as being fired only seconds beforehand thus making it entirely ineffectual if it was intended as a warning.

Lastly, the shooting clearly went on for many seconds after the crowd had turned and was running away from the fire. This is documented in the video evidence but is also repeatedly described in witness testimonies and shown by the fact that the vast majority of victims suffered bullet wounds inflicted from the back or side.

 

6. Responsibility for the shooting 

There exists great dispute amongst the different security forces present during the demonstration as to who had in fact fired directly at the protestors and caused the resulting deaths and injuries. When questioned, none of the different commanders involved admitted that his specific unit had fired at all, save for maybe some warning shots at most. However, there exists substantial evidence to assist in the analysis of the credibility of such claims.

  a. Governors bodyguard team:

 Almost all available evidence and statements heavily implicate the personal bodyguard team of the governor, deputy governor and the governors staff (henceforth referred to as the governors bodyguards) in shooting directly at unarmed protestors.

 The self-declared commander of the governors bodyguards claimed that he was not aware who fired but the governors bodyguards did not shoot. However, an international ISAF PRT team and police criminal investigations officer along with other witnesses positively identified at least one member of the governors bodyguard force, as he was standing on the roof of the police HQ and firing directly at the crowd. In addition, 7 of the 15 victims interviewed in the hospital specifically stated that they positively identified governors bodyguards shooting at the people, with several more witnesses claiming that most of the shooting came from the governors compound. One, for instance, said that he saw the governors security personnel use AK47s and Kalakovs to shoot at the crowd. Another said, I saw the governors security organs shooting at the crowd and not the police officers. Although they were wearing similar uniforms, I recognized the governors security personnel. Finally, the guilt of the governors bodyguard team is also supported by the testimony of international military eyewitnesses and by the statements of the commanders of all the other security forces present.

 b. Afghan National Army (ANA):

 Most of the available evidence suggests that that the ANA team on the scene complied with their rules of engagement and generally fired into the air rather than directly at protestors.

 Their acting commander claimed that his unit was under specific orders from their headquarters not to fire at the crowd and that it complied with these orders, at most firing into the air. Other statements seem to substantially confirm this. A Swedish ISAF PRT observer saw the  ANA firing more or less in the air from their hips and several of the American forces on site also state the ANA troops fired their rifles in the air or at the ground but not directly at the protestors. In addition, not a single one of those injured reported being shot by the ANA. Indeed, some witnesses positively exonerated the ANA troops present, making statements like I did not see the ANA open fire at the crowd.

c. Afghan National Police (ANP): 

The exact role that the ANP played in the shooting of the protestors is the hardest to establish and no entirely clear picture emerges. Partly, this is due to the fact that two separate police units were operating in parallel and there is no realistic way of determining which officer reported to which unit. Above all though, it is due to the fact that many of the governors bodyguards were dressed in generic ANP uniforms even thought they were not under ANP command. Some of these armed men in police uniforms were later positively identified as members of the governors bodyguard team but the similarity seems to have lead to confusion amongst many of the witnesses. 

On the one hand, several of the victims alleged that police officers opened fire on them. One, for instance, stated, I saw the Police were carrying AK47s and used the AK47 to shoot at the crowd. The Police kept on shooting at the crowd even though the protestors retreated. Another also complained of being shot by somebody in a police uniform: I ran away and when I was moving away, a bullet hit my leg and I fell down. I hid myself in the ditch and the Police in blue uniform shot me again.

The latter statement clearly demonstrates the potential confusion caused by the use of the same uniforms by both the police and the governors bodyguards who, however, report up separate chains of command. Accordingly, there are contradictory accusations from witnesses and victims. Some blamed both security forces for the attacks on the protestors, claiming that the Police shot directly at the crowd [and] the Governors security personnel were also shooting from inside the Governors office. Others emphasized that only the governors bodyguards were to blame and that the ANP was innocent, making statements like I saw the Governors security personnel shoot at the crowd. The Police did not shoot.

Several international observers commented very positively on the actions of the provincial chief of police during the demonstration. Allegedly he made very concerted efforts to deescalate the situation and ordered his men not to respond violently to the provocation of General Dostums pictures being put up on the walls of the police headquarters building by the demonstrators. Similarly, the police chief also rejected the use of water cannons to brake up the demonstration, fearing a further provocation of the crowd. The chief of police himself also emphasizes that the killing was done by unauthorized people in police uniforms [who, according to his statement, were under the command of the governor] and that, in effect, the police was trapped between the two sides.

Overall, there is probably not sufficient evidence to show with any certainty that regular ANP officer were also firing directly at the protesters. However, at the very least the police probably deserve some blame for failing to appreciate the gravity of the situation and dispersing the crowd by using the available water cannons before any shots could be fired. The head of NSDs complaint that the police department did not seem well-prepared is probably also warranted, though much of this could be blamed on the lack of availability of non-lethal weapons and training in their use.

7. Culpability

a. A failure of command:

At the very least the shooting of 51 unarmed people on 28 May was the result of a disastrous and severely negligent failure of command.

At the demonstration, at least 5 different security forces (two separate ANP units, NSD, ANA and the governors bodyguard), all with their own separate chains of command, participated in the security operation. As the overall commander of all security forces in the province it was clearly the responsibility of the governor and his deputy to ensure that a unified command was put in place. This never happened. When asked who was in charge of the overall operational planning and command the governor insisted that because of the state of emergency there was no single commander of the operation. All acting commanders of the different security forces confirmed this.

The provincial government had been given advance warning of the demonstration. Two emergency meetings had been held and there was obviously sufficient concern to take several precautionary measures. These included calling in additional security forces as reinforcements and, according to the chief surgeon, alerting the hospital to prepare for as many as 200 casualties.

In the light of these steps it was simply inexcusable that the governor and his deputy failed to appoint a single commander in chief as the overall responsible for security operations on the day of the protest. This is especially so, as they obviously must have been aware of fact that neither the ANA they called in nor governors bodyguard team reported to the chief of police and that he therefore had no way of effectively supervising the operation on his own initiative. 

b. An order to shoot?

 There are a number of highly concerning signs that the events of 28 May were the result of a specific order to open fire on a crowd of unarmed protesters rather than merely a tragic failure of command. None of the evidence suggesting this is absolutely conclusive, though as a whole it certainly raises some extremely problematic questions.

First, the most obvious indication that the shooting of the protestors was done under command rather than caused by tragic individual lapses of control, is the sheer number and timely coordination of guns being fired. The videos, witness testimonies and scale and kind of injuries all make it clear that at the same time a relatively large number of guns were firing at the demonstrators from different geographic locations. While not impossible, it does seem unlikely that in both waves of shooting such coordination was just the incidental result of a number of individually initiated actions.

Second, one victims statement alleges that while he was lying on the ground injured, another injured youth lying next to him was intentionally shot again by a man in a police uniform.

Third, the acting commander of the ANA reported that after the first wave of shooting his troops tried to assist the injured people but were told from the governors rooftop not to approach them. 

Fourth, finally, are the reports of the shootings being preceded by a single shot a few seconds beforehand (discussed in section 4.c.). This is especially problematic in the light of one victims statement that this first shot was the one that killed Qurban, the Junbish deputy youth leader, who died from a clean shot to the head. The victim testified that When the shooting started, I ran away. I was near Qurban and I saw one soldier shoot him. Then the other soldiers started to shoot at the crowd. I ran away and I left Qurban there.

As stated above none of these facts conclusively proves that a specific order to shoot at the protestors was indeed given. In combination they do, however, make it seem somewhat unlikely that this was not the case. As was previously established no unified command existed for the security operation on 28 May. Amongst all the security units involved, the governors bodyguard team is by far the most consistently and most seriously implicated in the shootings of 28 May. It would thus be highly likely that any order to shoot at the demonstrators also emanated from within its chain of command.

 Annex: List of Victims

VICTIMS KILLED

In addition to the 7 people who died of their injuries in Sheberghan hospital, another 2 of those moved to other hospitals for treatment were later reported dead. Their identities could not yet be confirmed though it is clear that one died in the German hospital at ISAF Regional Command (North) in Mazar-i-Sharif and the other in a hospital in Kabul.

 

No.	Name	Age	Place of residence	Injuries
1.	Qurban s/o Shah Nazar	33	Chaghai	Bullet injuries of the head and damaging orbit and brain
2.	Zulmay s/o Mohammad Ibrahim	28	Dida Mosh	Bullet injuries in the belly and chest
3.	Saifuddin s/o Ghulam Sarwar	25	Khelwati	Bullet injuries
4.	Mohammad Akbar s/o Ghulam Nabi	21	Baqiya Mesgari	Bullet injuries of artery and intestine
5.	Abu Zai s/o Mohammad Jan	18	Mirwais Mina	Bullet injuries of the trachea
6.	Najibullah s/o Abdul Ahad	25	Kahlak	Bullet injuries of the abdomen
7.	Najmuden (Fathers name unavailable)	-	Kahlak	Information unavailable
8.	Unknown
9.	Unknown

 

 

VICTIMS INJURED

 

Note that two of those listed below as injured are now deceased, having succumbed to their injuries (see entries 8. and 9. in the victims killed table above).

 

No.	Name	Age	Place of Residence	Injuries
1.	Mohammad Naim s/o Mohammad Murad	40	Andkhoy district	Bullet injuries on the thigh without fracture
2.	Roeen s/o Raheemullah	20	Arab Khana	Bullet left inside of leg
3.	Hayatullah s/o Akhtar Mohammad	28	Tanka	Bullet injuries on arm
4.	Amanullah s/o Qurban Nazar	29	Charshanba	Bullet injuries on left leg
5.	Mohammad s/o Khodaidad	28	Eid Mahalla	Bullet injuries and open fracture of hand
6.	Islam s/o Rahman Khul	28	Qanjugha	Bullet touching right knee and right arm
7.	Ghulam Sakhi s/o Mohammad Sharif	30	-	Abdomen injuries
8.	Mohammad Asef s/o Mohammad Rahim	21	Eid Mahalla	Bullet injuries on the left foot
9.	Enayatullah so Mohammad Asef	17	Eid Mahalla	Bullet injuries on the right leg
10.	Mohammad Din s/o Mohammad Amin	19	Eid Mahalla	Bullet injuries on the right foot
11.	Din Mohammad s/o Joora		Kenara	Bullet injuries on the right hand
12	Syed Omar s/o Syed Rasool	24	Yaka Bagh	Bullet injuries without fracture
13.	John Mohammad s/o Faiz Mohammad	22	Yaka Bagh	Bullet injuries on the right thigh
14.	Ali Mohammad s/o Panji	28	Eid Mahalla	Bullet injuries on the metacarpi of left hand
15.	Qari Jalal s/o Turson	24	Andkhoy	Bullet injuries on the right leg with fracture
16.	Abdul Satar s/o Toora	42	Khowja Dokoh	Bullet fracture of the abdomen
17.	Qari Nasir (fathers name not available)	35		Scalp injuries
18.	Najeebullah s/o Mohammad Hussein	18	Mirwais Mina	Abdomen injuries from bullet impact
19.	Ewaz Gildy s/o Hakeem	30	Qazancha	Bullet injuries on the thigh
20.	Mohammadullah s/o Abdul Hamed	60	Zargar Khana	Bullet injuries of abdomen and chest
21.	Ali Mohammad s/o Khudainazar	18	Mirwais Mina	Bullet injuries on left thigh and destruction of nerve
22.	Shokrullah s/o Abdullah	20	Khair Khana	Bullet injuries on left thigh with fracture
23.	Ezatullah Haji Ismail	17	Yaka Bagh	Bullet injuries on the abdomen
24.	Baser s/o Mohammad Yusuf	20	Arab Khana	Bullet injuries of the leg and chest with fracture
25.	Saber s/o Mohammad Khan	30	Khowja Dokoh	Bullet injuries on the left knee with left foot without fracture
26.	Mohammad Asef s/o Momen	18	Darzab	Bullet injuries on left leg with fracture
27.	Zaman s/o Abdul Rahman	32	Ettifaq Mosque	Bullet injuries on right foot
28.	Ramesh s/o Najmuddin	18	Eid Mahallah	Bullet injuries on the abdomen and hip
29.	Khair Mohammad s/o Abdul Hameed	19	Baba Ali	Bullet injuries of the joint of the arm
30.	Ghawsuddin s/o Mohammad Zarif	60	Baba Ali	Injuries and lesion on the left arm
31.	Ghaibullah s/o Abdul Razeq	30	Kahlak	Bullet injuries on the scalp
32.	Mohammad Naim s/o Haji Ismail	25	Yaka Bagh	Fracture of right hand due to strike
33.	Abdul Raof s/o Mohammad	20	Faryab	Surface bullet injuries of right leg
34.	Mohammad Raheem s/o Mohd Akbar	22	Afghan Tepa	Bullet injuries of lower hand
35.	Abdul Hameed s/o Ashore Pahlawan	20	Bandar Aqcha